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Introduction
The importance of the United States in international capital markets suggests that news about Fed monetary policy will influence stock markets around the world. We concentrate our analysis on major equity markets in Europe and the Pacific region as these have strong trade and financial relations with the United States. U.S. financial markets adjust not only to monetary policy actions but also to informal channels of communication by Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007) . Consequently, other developed equity markets could be expected to undergo adjustments after U.S. monetary policy communications. For example, Nikkinen et al. (2006) demonstrate that European and Asian countries are closely integrated with respect to U.S. macroeconomic news.
Some influential studies show that U.S. monetary policy actions affect international equity markets, including those in Europe and Asia. For instance, Conover et al. (1999) find that foreign stock returns are higher in expansionary U.S. and local monetary environments. Kim (2003) shows that scheduled U.S. macroeconomic announcements elicit significant first and second moment influences on returns in Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Hausman and Wongswan (2006) document the influence of U.S. monetary policy surprises on foreign equity indices in 49 countries, finding that a 25 bps cut is associated with a 1 percent increase in foreign equity markets. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) analyze 50 equity markets and find that returns fall by around 3.8 percentage points in response to a 100 basis point tightening of U.S. monetary policy. An important shortcoming of these studies, however, is that their analyses do not include all types of FOMC communications and hence may underestimate the true effects of U.S. monetary policy on international equity markets and investor wealth.
Our approach is unique in that we analyze the effect of all types of FOMC communications regarding monetary policy and economic outlook on European and Pacific equity markets returns. We examine a rich combination of FOMC news, including postmeeting statements, monetary policy reports, speeches, and testimonies, on the basis of its written content. Econometrically, we employ a pooled GARCH model with country-specific fixed effects. We address three questions: (1) Do U.S. monetary policy actions and communications affect international equity market returns? (2) What types of communication matter most? and (3) Are European markets affected differently than Pacific markets?
Data and Econometric Methodology
We use the data set introduced by Hayo et al. (2008) , which contains 663 speeches and 151 congressional hearings by FOMC members, as well as 68 post-meeting statements and 20 otherwise. zero and European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and seven Pacific countries (Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan). Returns are computed by taking first differences of daily stock price indices in logarithms. Using a panel framework increases the number of observations for each type of news and improves estimation efficiency; however, such a framework also means assuming equal coefficients across countries and a common error structure, which are potentially problematic.
Descriptive statistics show that the equity market series exhibit volatility clustering (Engle, 1982) . As per Equation (1), we start with a general autoregressive-distributed lag GARCH(1,1) specification (Bollerslev, 1986) simplified by a consistent testing-down process.
(1) where α 0 , α 1 , β 1 , μ, κ 1 , κ 2 , γ, δ, ζ, η, θ, ι, and λ are parameters or vectors of parameters, τ is an indicator function as defined in the last line above, and ε t |Γ t-1 = t(v). Γ t-1 captures all information up to t-1, and t(v) is a t-distribution with v degrees of freedom.
The vector of controls contains lagged returns, S&P 500 returns, changes in the 10-year U.S. government bond, growth rates of the U.S. dollar effective exchange rate, and dummies for country-specific effects and September, 11 2001. 
Empirical Analyses
Starting from this comprehensive GARCH(1,1) specification, we exclude all insignificant variables in a general-to-specific testing-down approach at a 1 percent level of significance.
The remaining variables are reported in Table 1 Speeches by BOG members cause adjustments in both markets. European markets decline by 44 bps over two days after indications of future rate hikes, significantly more than Pacific markets (18 bps). Speeches communicating a positive EO move European markets up by 13 bps one day later. All types of MP news have statistically the same impact on European markets, but news about the future of the economy is more important when communicated in a MPR than when it is given in testimonies and speeches. In Pacific markets, this relationship is reversed as the less formal congressional hearings exert a larger impact than post-meeting statements.
A final set of tests compares the influence of MP and EO news: for European markets and speeches, we find significantly stronger reactions to MP news.
Conclusions
We examine the effects of FOMC communications and federal funds target rate changes on European and Pacific equity market returns using a rich GARCH panel specification with country-specific fixed effects. Target These results are robust. The homogeneity assumption underlying the pooling approach is supported and the separation into European and Pacific markets is valid.
Including national target rate variables in our model to control for changes in domestic monetary policies does not change our main results. Accounting for the impact of a country's real (financial) integration with the United States yields no additional insight, nor does controlling for its monetary regime.
